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The Camera at War: War photography from 1848 to the present day Jorge Lewinsky, Octopus Books 1986
Part Five – Intense Explorer - Vietnam. A War in Close-Up
So far as the photographic coverage is concerned, there never was, and probably never will be, another war like Vietnam. Throughout its long duration not only were photographers and correspondents given absolute freedom but they were actively encouraged. Hotels, transport, and information services were laid on for them by the host warring nation. On occasions even, their fares were paid - just so that they could come, look and report. The Americans argued that in this way their own involvement would be reported world-wide in a favourable light. In effect they were trying to buy good notices, in the same way that a record company will provide free discs and the odd expense-account meal. Vietnam was a big production number, a big sell. This method worked for a while; the good press certainly outweighed the bad at the start, but in the end the whole sordid mess blew up in their faces.
The main point here is, however, that, whatever the reason, Vietnam was the freest war to cover. In other wars, for example the Yom Kippur War in Israel, the tendency was to clamp down, impose censorship, and make the life of a correspondent as difficult as possible; in Vietnam this was never the case. 'You from Times in Timbuktu - have a helicopter and a girl interpreter' could be taken as the slogan of the American public relations' attitude to media people. There were occasional exceptions - some photographers, including Philip Jones Griffiths, were banned from returning to Vietnam after they had published material which compromised the Americans. But on his first visit, as soon as the correspondent or photographer could produce evidence that he had a platform for his copy or his images -that they would be printed -he was accepted and on the whole was offered a great deal of assistance. For war photographers, Vietnam was in the nature of a 'promised land' which they are unlikely to find again.
There were other aspects of the coverage of the war in Vietnam which made it unique. The growing trend towards more violent images has already been noted in our discussion of the civil wars in Bangladesh and Lebanon. Its gestation period, indeed its birth, took place in Vietnam. Because of the U S A's involvement in the war, the American media market - the largest in the world - of magazines, periodicals, newspapers, books and television provided the widest platform ever for the publication of pictures of the war throughout its long duration. The public became satiated on a strong diet of war images, and the press responded by providing a stronger fare of yet more violent imagery to satisfy their audience, seemingly hungry for greater thrills.
The photographer, the maker of the images, found himself in the position of being expected to comply with the demand. There is no intention to suggest here that this stooping to public demand, in effect supplying thrills for the populace in the form of sickening pictures of war, was a deliberate policy of all modern war photographers. It simply is not the case. Many photographers remain idealists. They try to fight violence in the future by showing how horrifying and despicable it is. They may feel, however, that with twenty years of seeing war pictures at the breakfast table, the public needs ever stronger pictures to be shocked out of its complacency. Others, less scrupulous however, do just shovel up dirt and horror because it sells well, because the demand is there.
But whatever the intentions behind the trend, whether they be well meant or base, the fact remains that the pictures shot in Vietnam were turned into a means of exploitation. They ceased to be a documentary record of events and became a commodity in themselves - for good or evil purposes.
This new tendency for war photography to be undertaken to satisfy extrinsic market demands rather than for intrinsic reasons - aesthetic or documentary -is in part a result of the improvement in the quality of the photographs themselves, for technically the photographer is now capable of achieving more or less whatever effect he desires. But in the main it is the inevitable corollary of the omnipresence, the ubiquity of war in our time. Vietnam contributed to this state and provided us with more than its share of pictures of a shocking or atrocious nature.
There is yet another aspect which has to be considered which contributed to the importance of the Vietnam War in the history of photography. With the exception of W. Eugene Smith and George Rodger, both of whom refused to photograph any more wars, all the greatest living war photographers came to Vietnam at one time or another. Because of the importance of the war itself and because of the sheer volume of images it provided, Vietnam helped to raise war photography to a new status. We can look back to the pictures of the war in the Pacific by W. E. Smith and David Douglas Duncan's photographs of Korea as the starting point, but it was in the images of Vietnam that the relatively new medium of war photography attained the status of a recognized art form.
Vietnam provided for McCullin, Burrows, Griffiths, Duncan, Leroy and many others the chance to achieve something more than mere records of fighting. It helped to create a new style, a new visual awareness; it helped to produce icons, symbols of the terrifying essence of war. Many photographers were given the opportunity to analyse and dissect, and thereby to understand, the nature of their work in relation to the war itself, and their depth of understanding and compassion enabled the public in general to see the deeper strata of man's emotions as well as his inhumanity. This introspection and the insights it engendered led to the Vietnam War being a stage for intense exploration, for looking at war with an even more penetrating eye. War photography started with a cautious glance from a safe distance; it ends with a keen gaze through a microscope.
The Prologue – Indochina
The strange and unreal siege of Dien Bien Phu, which ended with the surrender of the French on 7 May 1954, marked the close of a seven-year struggle in Indochina. It was, to all intents and purposes, a classic confrontation between the colonial power of France, exhausted and not yet fully recovered from the ravages of the Second World War, but anxious to re-establish her lost prestige, and the Vietnamese insurgents with their communist-inspired militant nationalism. The Viet Minh, the League for the Independence of Vietnam, under the leadership of the communist-trained Ho Chi Minh, pitted themselves against French troops in a protracted guerilla campaign. The war dragged on interminably; the flower of the French Military Academy of St Cyr, constantly foiled and outwitted by the tactics of the Vietnamese, liberally soaked the Indochinese soil with their blood.
The battle for Dien Bien Phu, which was supposed to end the war decisively, was a courageous but ill-conceived gamble. A French regiment was parachuted into the centre of enemy-held territory in the north west of Vietnam in an attempt to lure into battle and destroy the guerilla forces of the Viet Minh. Instead, the venture turned into a 169-day siege, until the French were finally blasted out by Vietnamese artillery brought on the backs of peasants all the way from China.
The long struggle which lead up to Dien Bien Phu was hardly reported at all. The attention of the press was focused on the Korean War. But the siege of Dien Bien Phu brought an invasion by the press, although the battle itself was extremely difficult to cover from the outside. It was 100 miles from Hanoi and with Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire daily gaining strength and accuracy, a flight to the battle area was a very hazardous mission indeed. Only one photographer managed to get through, a French paratrooper, Daniel Camus, but his pictures show little of the dreadful conditions and the final humiliation of the French crack troops. But the fall of Dien Bien Phu served to bring the war and Indochina to the world's attention, and a number of photographers and correspondents stayed on to record and report the winding up of the French involvement. One of them was Robert Capa.
John Mecklin, a Time/Life correspondent who worked with Capa in Indochina, tells the story of Capa's last assignment. They both came to Indochina during the siege. As no pictures by Capa of the siege exist, presumably neither of them managed to get near the beleaguered garrison. But they stayed on after the surrender and on 25 May were working together in the Red River delta during the last stages of the French occupation. The cease-fire was to be signed in Geneva seven days later.
Capa was anxious to shoot a story which he had tentatively entitled 'Bitter Rice', a picture essay showing the contrast between the inhuman war machines of the modern army of occupation and the peaceful pursuits of the peasants quietly tending their rice fields - a parable of life and death. The column of French soldiers with which they were travelling was constantly being halted by Viet Minh ambushes and attacks.
On one of these enforced stops, about 45 miles from Hanoi, rear Thai Binh, Capa, bored with the slow progress and impatient as usual, decided to walk ahead. Half an hour later a soldier came up to the column and said something in Vietnamese to one of the officers. The officer then approached the jeep in which the correspondents were travelling and said: 'Le photographe est mort.' Capa had stepped on an antipersonnel bomb while walking at the side of the road. He was rushed to a nearby hospital where a Vietnamese doctor, having confirmed that he was dead, asked: 'Is he the first American correspondent killed in Indochina?' When he received the confirmatory answer, he added: 'It is a harsh way for the Americans to learn.' The doctor's words were to prove prophetic. In the years to come, the world and the Americans themselves found that they were to take a long time learning.
Robert Capa
The Enactment – Vietnam
The Vietnam War was a war fought 'for the minds of men'. With France, a useful buffer in Indochina, out of the way, China was spreading its communist tentacles even wider. The United States, therefore, decided that a stand should be made, not so much for military bases, but rather to prevent the total spread of communist ideology in Asia and instead to plant the seeds of democratic materialism. Unfortunately, although the Americans never lacked for an abundance of material goods - guns and butter - they were singularly lacking in tact and finesse. The Vietnamese, for their part, were quite willing to accept all that they were given, but they were far less inclined to swallow the ideology and western values that were served along with the abundant goods.
The two cultures - brash western and gentle eastern - had no common meeting-point, no way of communicating. Both ended by disdaining and despising each other. To the Americans, the Vietnamese - whether the Americans' allies in the south or their enemies in the north - were simply 'gooks', 'dinks', 'slopes', with no more human attributes than a donkey; to the Vietnamese, the Americans were all soft-touch barbarians that one 'conned' but did not invite home. The Americans never did find the key to the Vietnamese mind. They tried very hard indeed at first, but when no signs of any success could be discerned, their approach became more aggressive and desperate.
Finally a totally grotesque situation was reached with the US Marines indiscriminately killing friend and foe alike on the pretext of saving them from an evil worse than the napalm bomb. My Lai and other atrocities were the inevitable outcome.
The extent of the media coverage of the Vietnam War, both in words and pictures, was unprecedented. Its growth and intensity paralleled what became known as the 'escalation' of war activities. Up to 1960 the American military involvement was quite insignificant, at least in terms of manpower, and very carefully camouflaged. At the time only about 700 US advisers to the Vietnamese army were present, but this number grew rapidly and reached some 17000 by the end of 1963. This increase again was played down and hardly reported.
The first half of 1963 suddenly threw the Vietnamese arena into sharper relief, and the international press immediately took notice. In January the first real battle of the war took place, in Ap Bac, where three Americans were killed. Soon after, Buddhist opposition was highlighted by the dramatic and public immolation of a Buddhist monk, witnessed and photographed by Malcolm Browne of Associated Press. The American build-up of troops, especially helicopter pilots, began in earnest in 1964, and in February the following year, the bombings of Hanoi were ordered by President Johnson. A month later, detachments of Marines were regularly disembarking in Vietnam. Early in 1968 the number of troops reached and exceeded half a million.
In spite of the rapid intensification of the war and the extensive bombings, the Viet Cong staged the famous Tet offensive in February 1968, occupying and holding for a time a number of important points and cities in the South. The capacity of the North Vietnamese to survive all that was rained down on them by the most up-to-date American war methods, and still come back on the offensive, finally convinced the Americans that they were indeed fighting a losing battle. From the end of 1968, despite the additional flare-up of hostilities in Laos and Cambodia in 1970, the curve of American involvement began its downward trend, leading slowly to the January 1973 cease-fire and complete withdrawal.
The surge and ebb of the American military involvement was reflected in the number of correspondents and photographers in Vietnam. In 1961 there were only a handful of pressmen in the country, and this group remained small and fairly constant until 1963. Between 1963 and 1965 the press corps grew steadily, but it was largely confined to correspondents and photographers on short-term assignments. After 1965 there was a constant increase in the number of permanently resident journalists; by 1968 the reporting community had swelled to 700 people. Then this high-water mark slowly ebbed away - the number was 467 in 1969, 392 in 1970, 350 in 1971, until it fell to only sixty-nine by mid-1974. With the decline of the American war effort, the interest in Vietnam slowly subsided.
What attracted the vast number in the first place, apart from the interest in the war itself, were the freedom of reporting never before experienced and the complete lack of censorship. Whatever other faults the Americans displayed in Vietnam, they did not lack respect for freedom of the press. Correspondents might have been harassed at times, or in some cases not allowed entry visas, but once they were there, their work was never censored. Indeed, what the American authorities attempted vis-a-vis the horde of pressmen from all over world was not to check their copy or their films, but to convert them to the American cause by the most skilful and widespread public relations campaign ever mounted. Not only did they provide lodging, transport, meals, specially conducted tours and presents, but they also employed all kinds of more or less subtle inducements to win favourable copy. Appeals were made to the patriotism and loyalty of the American press representatives, and many smaller papers and some foreign correspondents were even helped financially to travel to Vietnam and report on the war.
But as with the Vietnamese population, where wooing had failed to convert, these methods also foundered in the long run. There were, indeed, a number of correspondents and photographers who took the bait and could not but feel a certain amount of gratitude for such lavish hospitality. Even if no reports were completely biased or falsified, much was concealed and glossed over for a considerable period. For example, the extent of corruption and graft among the US troops, their drug addiction and lax morals, their numerous instances of cruelty and savagery towards foe and allies alike.
The press appreciated their freedom. Accreditation was easy to obtain provided the correspondent or photographer could show that his work would be published and that he had some backing or support from a newspaper or magazine. Simple formalities were all that was needed to acquire a press card. After which the correspondent was free to go virtually wherever he or she pleased. The American servicemen were themselves acutely publicity conscious and would go to almost any lengths to secure a mention or a picture in print.
At no stage of the war was there a well-defined front line. Most of the fighting was sporadic and fairly unpredictable. But whenever there was a newsflash about a skirmish, a battle or planned sortie of either US or South Vietnamese detachments on a 'search and destroy' mission within a reasonable distance of Saigon, all a photographer had to do was go to a taxi rank, mostly of old American vehicles, and hire a cab for the day. This was common during the Tet offensive. Within an hour's taxi ride the photographer could hear the sounds of battle. When the fighting was farther away, he could get a lift in one of the numerous helicopters; there were also daily flights from Saigon to Danang in the northern theatre of operations with up to fifteen places a day reserved for the press corps. Helicopters were on permanent stand-by to fly pressmen virtually anywhere within a 100-mile radius of Saigon, provided that at least three people wanted to go to the same place. As the television crews consisted of a minimum of three people, a photographer could join them and find himself in the locality of his choice with relative ease. Such facilities were not just a matter of extravagant generosity on the part of the Americans, for by them they were able to obtain a great deal of publicity at a relatively low cost and also gain additional training for their pilots.
Because of the ease with which they could get to the fighting, writers and particularly photographers were exposed to considerable physical risks. Many died. Forty-five war correspondents were killed in Vietnam, and a further twenty were listed as missing, believed dead. Philip Jones Griffiths dedicated his book, Vietnam Inc., to four close friends who lost their lives in the war: Larry Burrows, Henri Huet (see image above), Kyochi Sawada and Keisaburo Shomamoto. ( See Daily Mail illustrated article on Larry Burrows and Time Life exhibition)
The fatalities most frequently occurred on the helicopter flights, but mines and snipers took their toll as well. In May 1968, while driving in a jeep near Cholon, five foreign correspondents encountered a detachment of Viet Cong who ignored the repeated shouts of 'Bao chi' (press) and opened fire with machine guns, according to the one survivor. The news of this cold-blooded killing made a great impression on the reporters; one United Press photographer, Charles Eggleston, armed himself the next day and went alone on a suicidal vendetta. He was never seen again, but apparently he did manage to kill several Viet Cong. Despite the dangers, many photographers came to the war - lured by the excitement and the prospect of financial rewards. Many came as freelances, paying their own fares, or even hitch-hiked as Tim Page did. The majority found willing employers.
Associated Press, one of half a dozen agencies which kept a permanent staff in Saigon, listed eight photographers in Vietnam during 1966, including three Vietnamese -Al Chang, Le Ngoe Cung, and Dan van Phnoe who served them for many years. Another of the AP photographers was Eddie T. Adams, who became famous with his picture of a Viet Cong being shot (right); Henri Huet, who died with Burrows in 1967, was employed by Associated Press. By 1969 the number of AP photographers had grown to ten, and included a woman, Yvonne Cornu. Their star performer was Horst Faas.
Faas spent eight years in Vietnam working for AP from 1962. He had a permanent base in Saigon and covered all the significant phases of the war. He received the Pulitzer Prize for his war pictures in the early period, as well as the Robert Capa Memorial Award in 1965. With his unemotional approach and totally professional attitude, Faas was an ideal war photographer for the magazines. His operations were always planned in detail. To gain the confidence of the South Vietnamese soldiers and the civilian population, he used to carry a small polaroid camera and distribute instantaneous pictures. His dedication and professionalism were exemplified by the way in which he would assess the fighting potential of the soldiers he chose to accompany. He invariably refused to go on missions with platoons he considered to be not entirely reliable either due to their lax discipline or slovenly behaviour. He always maintained that he did not mind taking necessary risks, but he never left anything to chance -not even his choice of battle companions. Like Larry Burrows, he designed for himself a special combat outfit, which included a custom-made aluminium waterproof container for his 35-mm Leicas. (Below Faas 1964)
By 1966 Faas was in charge of the whole of the Associated Press outfit in Vietnam. He hired many young photographers as 'stringers', often local Vietnamese, and used them quite ruthlessly. He would buy their pictures, which they had frequently taken at great personal risk, for paltry amounts; the pictures were not even credited to the individual photographers on publication. He developed a depersonalized assembly-line method of picture production. In such a situation a certain amount of exploitation is perhaps inevitable. As, for example, when a negative is bought. Usually, it is 'clipped' with the adjoining negatives on either side. How is a photographer to know that only the centre negative will be used? Perhaps too protracted a contact with death and danger does change a man. One cannot escape the notion that the brave, tough war photographer, Horst Faas, developed a hardened attitude, especially towards enemy soldiers whom he came to hate and disdain. Whether he was able to maintain a balanced, unprejudiced viewpoint at the same time is debatable.
Such cynicism was prevalent among many of the correspondents, and also among the majority of American soldiers. Philip Knightley quotes John Shaw, a war correspondent: 'Things which shocked you when you first went there six weeks later slide over you.' The process of dehumanizing the enemy reached such an extreme that a 'gook' was no longer a human being but a thing - a big hunt trophy. Knightley quotes many terrifying instances: heads cut off and arranged in decorative patterns, parts of bodies preserved as souvenirs, even lampshades made of skin. Collecting 'interesting' snapshots of dead or dying Viet Cong became a hobby with some GIs. Marines were photographed posing with one foot on the chest of a dead enemy. Killing became a distorted game. Specially printed visiting cards were left on bodies: 'Congratulations - you have been killed through courtesy of the 361st' or 'Call us for death and destruction, day or night'. This practice was applied equally to the bodies of women and children.
Not too fine a distinction was made between armed soldiers of the Viet Cong and peasants who might simply have been North Vietnamese sympathizers. Philip Jones Griffiths relates in his book how he went on one of the notorious 'search and destroy' raids with a detachment of inexperienced and rather nervous young soldiers. The moment then saw the figure of a Vietnamese farmer in the distance, they fired and missed. 'The next farmer was not so lucky. Soon he lay dying among the ripening rice in a corner of the paddy field, the back of his skull blown away. He was somewhat conscious, making a whimpering sound and trying to squeeze his eyes more tightly shut. He never spoke and died with the fingers of his left hand clutching his testicles so tightly they could not be undone. "Got him in the balls, knew I hit him," cried the boy from Kansas, until someone took him to one side and explained that they do that to relieve the pain from elsewhere.'
The most publicized example of such wanton, senseless killing was the My Lai massacre. The execution of some 120 civilians, mostly women and children, in the village of My Lai on 16 May 1968 by officers and twenty-four men of C Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Brigade, was recorded by an army photographer, one Ronald L. Haeberle, of the 31st Public Information Department. On 16 May, Haeberle was carrying three cameras and was using both colour and black and white film. In one of his pictures, a group of terrified women huddle over their children. 'Guys were about to shoot these people,' Haeberle recalled afterwards. 'I yelled "Hold it" and I shot my pictures. Ml6s opened up and from the corner of my eye I saw bodies falling but I did not turn to look.' The picture shows the group in close up; it is sharply focused and well composed. Another of Haeberle's pictures is of a young boy hugging his wounded younger brother. They both lie in the middle of a path leading into the far distance. The photograph has an aesthetic beauty, a lovely landscape with figures. Minutes after it was taken, as stated by the photographer himself, two GIs approached the boys and each fired a bullet into their heads to finish them off.
It is hard to believe that a group of normal young men from farms in Missouri or offices in Dallas could have behaved in such a way, but we are not concerned here with the moral issue of soldiers shooting women and children in cold blood. That issue has been aired sufficiently already. What we are concerned with is the extraordinary attitude of the photographer.
When we read his story of this devastating half hour and his account of his own reactions while taking the pictures, we find it impossible to comprehend his actions. His pictures are gratuitous. He appears to have taken them purely for the sake of photographing an atrocity, spurred on by the hysteria of the moment. He seems to have had no thought that they could be used as an indictment of the action. On arriving back at base, he simply gave the black and white film to his army unit, and kept the colour shots. They were not made public until a year and a half later, after the details of the massacre itself had come to light.
The events at My Lai were brought to the attention of the authorities by a persistent series of letters to many prominent people in the USA, including the President, from a helicopter gunner who had heard some details of the massacre while still in Vietnam. Most of his letters remained unanswered, but Senator Morris Udall took the matter up with the result that Lieutenant Calley, the commanding officer of C Company, was eventually court-martialled. The whole matter was played down and the papers only published small items about it.
The affair might have remained dead and buried, had it not been for another persistent individual, freelance reporter Seymour Hersh (who later wrote a book on the massacre). Due to his patient digging, the scandal was brought into the open and written about in a number of papers in the USA and abroad, but the truth was only completely revealed when Haeberle's pictures were discovered by a reporter from the Cleveland Plain Dealer. His photographs were published in the magazine on 20 November 1969 in spite of David Douglas Duncan's pleading with the editors to withhold them because, so he believed, they were fakes. He also claimed that they would do a great deal of harm to the reputation of the US soldier, as, of course, they did. Later Life bought the pictures from Haeberle for 50 000 dollars and printed them in their issue of 19 January 1970.
Like the GIs, Haeberle seems to have undergone, through his experience of war at close quarters, a total distortion of the normal emotional and behavioural responses. The Vietnam War provided an ideal opportunity for studying the reactions of photographers to their work of photographing war. Some of their attitudes have already been discussed in the introduction. Thus, we find a total submergence of moral values in the case of Haeberle which can be compared with the partial and more gradual change that took place in Faas. The deliberate shutting out of unacceptable impressions, almost an emotional cowardice, found in Duncan can be contrasted with Burrows’ compassion and distress in perpetual conflict with his loyalty to his public and the country he worked for. Finally, Griffiths displays an uncompromising disgust and revulsion with the inhumanity of men whosoever they may be.
Haeberle's action seems to have stemmed from an unreasoning excitement engendered by the situation in which he found himself. Duncan's purpose was quite deliberate: to put the American marine on a pedestal prompted by a genuine patriotism and love for his country. Burrows survived to photograph and thereby reveal the insanity of war. Griffiths rises above them all, for he establishes and demonstrates that the evil of war is so great that it can and does deprave and warp even ordinary god-fearing men and transforms gentle boys into monsters.
Duncan, Burrows and Griffiths all produced books wholly or partially about Vietnam, Duncan's War Without Heroes, like his earlier This Is War, is divided into three acts: Cua Viet - September 1967, Con Thien - September/October 1967, and Khe Sanh - February 1968. The longer one turns the pages of this visual masterpiece, the more one becomes aware of a certain theatricality, as if Duncan were photographing a performance of a play, cut off from the rest of the world. The US marine is seen in close-up going bravely through the motions of making war on an invisible enemy.
Larry Burrows- Compassionate Photographer, which was published posthumously, is only partly devoted to Vietnam. It throbs with life and humanity. It is interesting to see the difference between an early story, 'Yankee Papa 13', which he shot near Danang in 1965 and which, like Duncan's book, is concerned with courage and fortitude (a young marine risking his life for a buddy and crying to see the futility of his actions), and Burrows’ later work in Vietnam. His superb colour photographs of the fighting in the Mekong Delta in 1968 are much more pessimistic and grim.
Burrows' colour work is outstanding; he achieves a curiously deadened tonality of greys and greens, with an occasional vivid splash of red.
There are two or three series of pictures in this book which are masterpieces of the métier, unsurpassed by anyone else. The last stories that Burrows shot in Vietnam are suffused with sadness. One is a story about a ten-year-old boy, Nguyen Lau, who had been paralysed from the waist down by a mortar fragment. He had received medical treatment for two years in the States, and his homecoming was photographed by Burrows. His rejection by his family and by his erstwhile playmates led him to leave his native village for good. Burrows’ story stands as a symbol of the futility of the American involvement in Vietnam. The last shots Burrows took were of the accidental bombing of South Vietnamese soldiers by US navy planes. A hundred of them were killed - yet another symbol of failure and misunderstanding. Three days later, Burrows himself died, shot down by enemy artillery over Laos.
Many photography critics maintain that Larry Burrows was the greatest of all war photographers. For total commitment and involvement in the subject, as well as for the sheer power and beauty of his images, it would be hard to find his peer. But if we consider the medium of photography to be a supreme witness and recorder of the world and the life we have fashioned upon it, no one has photographed to better or more incisive effect than Philip Jones Griffiths.
One of the finest photojournalists today (along with W. Eugene Smith), Griffiths devoted four years of his life to the creation of the definitive book on war. It is not the war which Duncan depicted (the front variety), although there is enough of that in Vietnam Inc. to give the book a balanced viewpoint, but a comprehensive, profound image of the totality of war, the way it affects soldier and civilian alike, the way the two become intertwined and together create the environment of a country at war. Vietnam Inc. is in the nature of a diary, but also a dissection of war into its various segments. Layer after layer, the facets of the war, and the groups of people connected or affected by it, are uncovered and magnified under Griffiths’ lens. The country, the village, its inhabitants; the American war machine, its origins, operation, constituent parts, its human element of soldiers and administrators; the interactions and relationships between the cultures of east and west, corruption, graft, drug-taking, prostitution; the degeneration of the soldiers; the misery of the people; the devastation; the slaughter.
Griffiths’ book has been skillfully assembled - its effect is cumulative; the visual narrative becomes sadder and grimmer as the story progresses. It begins with almost gay pictures of a beautiful, serene Vietnamese village and ends with shattering images of a shattered people, maimed or thrust into insanity by degradation and the constant fear of death. Ultimately the proud and happy Vietnamese become enchained. The book is a great documentary on war in its distressing totality. (See image below and Philip Jones-Griffiths at Magnum)
The war in South Vietnam was over-exposed and over-documented. Its effect on the North was hardly revealed. One day, perhaps, a book of pictures or a film taken by a Viet Cong photographer will emerge, but there is little indication that such photographs were taken or preserved. One Western photographer did, however, manage to get a glimpse of the adversary fighting in the South.
During the Tet offensive in 1968, the North Vietnamese for a short time occupied the city of Hue. Unaware that Hue was in enemy hands, Catherine Leroy flew there in the company of a journalist. They arrived in the evening and were able to enter the city where they spent the night in the cathedral. There were some 3000 refugees in Hue at the time and the church was full. The priest was rather taken aback at the presence of two 'whites', but did not object to their staying. They left the safety of the cathedral the following morning and, in spite of carrying a large sign with the words, in Vietnamese, 'French press from Paris', were promptly surrounded and arrested by the 'green men', who tied their hands behind their backs and confiscated their cameras. They were taken to a nearby villa and confined in the servants' quarters. Eventually, a Viet Cong officer arrived who untied them and returned their cameras. He even agreed to an interview and posed for photographs. Leroy and the journalist were later released and allowed to go back to their own side. Leroy's pictures were subsequently reproduced throughout the world.
Very few Western correspondents or photographers were allowed to visit North Vietnam itself. Two who did manage to make the trip were James Cameron and Romano Cagnoni, (see his website) who thus became the first photographer to visit communist Vietnam for eleven years, since the fall of Dien Bien Phu. They travelled as freelances, paying their own fares. Lengthy negotiations were required before the North Vietnamese authorities agreed to their visit. The decision to admit them may have been influenced by the fact that both Cameron and Cagnoni professed to be ideologically uncommitted. As Cagnoni says, they favoured unification of Vietnam, rather than an American victory. They had applied for visas just after the start of the massive American bombing raids on North Vietnam in February 1965. The visas were granted in the autumn and they arrived in Hanoi in November. They stayed in the North for twenty-six days.
Their visit was regarded as something of a test case by the North Vietnamese for they were the first non-communist journalists from the West. Although their tour was largely conducted and supervised, they had some freedom of movement, especially in Hanoi. Cagnoni's first ten films were confiscated; they were later returned to him half-ruined by rough processing. However, he was allowed to take the rest of his film out of the country uncensored. He does report that from time to time during his stay a 'large red hand' was raised in front of his camera to prevent him from taking a photograph. Neither Cagnoni nor Cameron were allowed to accompany units on combat missions, but Cagnoni did experience several US bombing raids which he was encouraged to photograph. His pictures were in great demand on his return to the West. Life, Stern and the Observer gave him extensive spreads and an exhibition of his pictures took place in London.
Cagnoni is one of the foremost of the world's photo-journalists. As a war photographer he ranks alongside Duncan, McCullin, Griffiths and Burrows. But whereas Duncan and Burrows have had their pictures prominently and regularly displayed in Life and McCullin in the Sunday Times, Cagnoni has always remained a completely independent freelance. Although his pictures have appeared in the leading magazines, including Life, Stern, Look and the British colour supplements, and although he is well known to the world's picture editors, his name is not so familiar to the general public. Hopefully, one day a book of his will appear to demonstrate his stature fully.
After Cameron's and Cagnoni's pioneering visit, a few other Western journalists were also invited to North Vietnam. Among them was Marc Riboud who went to Hanoi in 1968. The photographs that he took on that occasion are published in book form, entitled Face of North Vietnam.
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